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ALLOCATING RISKS AND SUFFERING: SOME HIDDEN TRAPS
JOHN FINNIS*
I
In his first lectures on jurisprudence, Adam Smith told his students
that the imperfect rights which are the subject of distributive justice do
not properly belong to jurisprudence. For they fall not under the juris-
diction of the laws but rather under "a system of morals." "We are there-
fore in what follows to confine ourselves entirely to the perfect rights,
and what is called commutative justice."' Of course, he did not in fact
confine himself to commutative justice, but discoursed broadly on the
foundations of government, on family and slavery, and on the wealth of
nations ("national opulence" as he then called it) which can meet the
natural wants of mankind by a division of labor based on the industry of
the people and proportioned to an appropriately regulated system of com-
merce. All this as Jurisprudence (and for students aged from 14 to 16)!
His The Theory of the Moral Sentiments, published three years earlier
in 1759, convincingly demonstrates Adam Smith's real familiarity with
the classics. Yet when he speaks of "distributive justice," to dismiss it
from Jurisprudence, he uses the term quite differently from Aristotle.2
For Aristotle, distributive justice concerns the problem of allocating the
community's common stock of resources, opportunities, profits and ad-
vantages, roles and offices, responsibilities, taxes and other burdens. In
Adam Smith's formal treatments of justice, this whole problem has dis-
appeared, along with the corresponding virtue of Aristotelian distributive
justice. Smith's "distributive justice" - and hereabouts he wishes to be
relying on Grotius, Pufendorf and his own Scottish philosophical mentor
Hutcheson, as well as his admired friend David Hume - concerns only
such matters as the weak, imperfect and metaphorical "right" of brilliant
or learned people to be praised, or the right of beggars to seek other
people's charity (which is not a right to be given anything, nor indeed an
enforceable right even to beg).
Adam Smith's jurisprudence is crippled by inattention to distributive
justice, to the allocation of the common stock of goods and roles (with the
risks incident to them). But in our day jurisprudence not only risks for-
getting commutative justice, but also risks misunderstanding (and mis-
locating the rationality of) the principles for resolving the problems of
distributive justice.
* Professor of Law and Legal Philosophy, Oxford University.
A. SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 9 (R. Meek, D. Raphael, & P. Stein
eds. 1978).
2A. SMITH, THE THEORY OF THE MORAL SENTIMENTS pt. VII, § ii, ch.1, 436 (West
ed. 1976) [hereinafter A. SMITH].
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II
The economic analysis of which Adam Smith is a principal founder is
helpful in practical reasoning about problems of justice precisely insofar
as it systematically calls attention to the side-effects of individual choices
and actions and behavior. Adam Smith's interest in side-effects is intense
and pointed even in his Theory of the Moral Sentiments, published 17
years before his The Wealth of Nations. In a brilliant chapter of the earlier
treatise he identifies the way in which admiration for technical accom-
plishment and potential utility overwhelms reasonableness in human
action - the way in which people, in my jargon, confuse capabilities and
attainments in the fourth order with reasonable goals and fulfillments
in the third.3 Anticipating the age of mail-order electronic gadgetry,
gentlemen of his time could be found with "their pockets stuffed with
little conveniences." "How many people ruin themselves by laying out
money on trinkets of frivolous utility? What pleases these lovers of toys,
is not so much the utility as the aptness of the machines which are fitted
to promote it."4 And in this sort of confusion and misdirection of sentiment
and of purpose, Adam Smith sees something which is "often the secret
motive of the most serious and important pursuits of both private and
public life"5 - Seen without the distorting influence of this confusion,
power and riches are nothing but "enormous and operose machines con-
trived to produce a few trifling conveniences to the body. ." But it is
good that nature induces in us this sort of confusion. For "It is this
deception which arouses and keeps in continual motion the industry of
mankind. '7 For, from the heap of wealth produced by this industry in the
deluded pursuit of riches and power,
the rich only select ... what is most precious and agreeable.
They consume little more than the poor; and in spite of their
natural selfishness and rapacity, though they mean only their
own conveniency, though the sole end which they propose from
the labors of all the thousands whom they employ be the grat-
ification of their own vain and insatiable desires, they divide
with the poor the produce of all their improvements. They are
led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution
of the necessaries of life which would have been made had the
earth been divided into equal portions among all its inhabit-
ants; and thus, without intending it, without knowing it, ad-
vance the interest of the society ... When providence divided
the earth among a few lordly masters, it neither forgot nor
abandoned those who had been left out of the partition. These,
too, enjoy their share of all that it produces. In what constitutes
3On the four orders of reality in which human life is lived, see Finnis, Natural
Law and Legal Reasoning, 38 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1990).
A. SMITH, supra note 2, at pt. IV, ch.1, 299.
Id. This use of "motive" is not to be confused with reasons which motivate
by entering into conscious deliberation and choice.
'Id. at 302.7Id. at 303.
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the real happiness of human life, they are in no respect inferior
to those who would seem so much above them.8
Here the invisible hand accomplishes what might have been the work of
the missing distributive justice. In The Wealth of Nations, the same or a
similar "hand" accomplishes rather the initial productive work of en-
hancing (domestic, national) wealth: the individual engaging in or, rather,
directing production "intends only his own gain," but "he is in this, as in
many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was
no part of his intention."9 In this later, more famous passage, Adam Smith
has qualified the reference to unawareness of the side-effects ("without
knowing it" is replaced by: not knowing "how much he is promoting it");
he now focuses rather on what is essential: the contrast with intention.
A side-effect, as I use the term, simply is an effect not intended - not
chosen either as end or as means - however much it may have been
foreseen by the one who intends, chooses and acts.
But you will have noticed Adam Smith's optimistic partiality in at-
tending to the side-effects of production. Not only is he sublimely opti-
mistic about the automaticity of the trickle-down benefits to the poor. He
is also entirely inattentive to the question of harmful side-effects of the
processes of production, distribution and consumption by the "vain and
insatiable" wealthy. Doubtless this inattention is little more than one
aspect of Adam Smith's failure to anticipate certain important aspects of
the impending industrial revolution. Still, it is notable. If providence,
without human attention or intention, is allocating to the poor a share
in the wealth produced at the direction of the rich, it is also allocating
to them an abundant share in the environmental degradation and risk
of environmental catastrophe engendered by the economic and security
policies of the rich(er).
The brilliance of Adam Smith's first account of the invisible hand con-
sists in his transformation of the classical reasons for denying that wealth
and power are the point of human existence. Without rejecting the clas-
sical critique of confusing mere means with intrinsic ends, Smith deepens
it by identifying the attraction of these means as an admiration for ex-
cellence - "aptness" - but excellence in an order (I call it the technical)
which is not to be confused with the existential order of human choices
oriented by intrinsic human goods. But the irony is this: Adam Smith's
own account, at least in this work, falls prey to the very fascination with
the technical which it denounces. Captivated by his genuine and fruitful
mastery of a new technique - let us call it economic(s) - the technique
of identifying causal systems created and constituted by the side-effects
of human choices whose intentions lie quite elsewhere, Smith neglects
to subordinate the technique to the ends and principles of reasonable
human existence, ends and principles which would have directed him to
an impartial survey of the risks and suffering engendered by the same
invisible hand of the economic system he misleadingly styles "provi-
dence."
8 Id. at 304-305 (emphasis added).
,,A. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS pt. IV, § ii, ch. 10, at 476 (Campbell &
Skinner eds. 1976).
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Of course, the developed analytical art of economics is well able and
used to make such an even-handed survey. And that, I repeat, is its true
utility as a help-mate for ethics and political theory and thus for juris-
prudence. Still, it would be a mistake to conclude that we need only a
more adequate account of the benefits and burdens up for distribution or
allocation by those responsible for the common good or general fate. We
need also to bear in mind what Smith did not forget and what economics
does not comprehend, the requirements of commutative justice. To see
this, we may look at one of the economic and security policies of the rich
which was developed in England in the half-century after Adam Smith's
flourishing: the policy of laying hidden traps.
III
These mantraps were, typically, spring-guns: heavily loaded shot-guns,
with triggers attached to springs and wires arranged in hidden lines along
which the blast of shot would travel when anybody tripped them. They
were set in woods and gardens to deter, disable and punish poachers, who
under the law of the day were no more than trespassers.
The ground of principle on which such lethal outdoor mantraps were
eventually prohibited by law is clearly stated by Holmes giving the ma-
jority judgment of the Supreme Court in 1921 in United Zinc & Chemical
Co. v. Britt: "The liability for spring guns and mantraps arises from the
fact that the defendant has not rested in [the] assumption [that tres-
passers would obey the law and not trespass], but on the contrary has
expected the trespasser and prepared an injury which is no more justified
than if he had held the gun and fired it."'" In other words, shooting
trespasser, who is engaged in no act of violence against oneself or another,
is simply killing with intent to kill, i.e. murder, or at least with intent to
do serious bodily harm; and setting a spring gun is just arranging to do
the same "without personally firing the shot."'1 What one lawfully cannot,
with intent, accomplish "directly" (in person) one cannot, with the same
intent, accomplish "indirectly" (mechanically).
It is embarrassing to have to say that when this argument was squarely
put before a strong Court of King's Bench in 1820 it was unanimously
rejected. 12 The arguments employed by the English judges to distinguish
shooting by machine from shooting in person are weak and of little in-
terest. Of greater interest is the preliminary argument employed in the
first two of the four judgments, an argument to which Holmes is respond-
ing when he says that the defendant landowner has not been content to
assume that trespassers will not trespass but has expected the trespasser
'0 258 U.S. 268 at 275 (1922) (emphasis added).
" Addie v. Dumbreck, A.C. 358, 376, 98 L.J.P.C. 119 (H.L. 1929).
12 Ilott v. Wilkes, 3 B. & Ald. 304, 311, 106 Eng. Rep. 674 (K.B. 1820). See the
opening sentences of the argument of counsel for the plaintiff-respondent. Id. at
307, 106 Eng. Rep. at 676.
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and "prepared for him an injury." The argument is one you sometimes
hear today when Christians try to defend the public policy of nuclear
deterrence against the well-grounded charge that it involves, willy nilly,
an intent to kill non-combatants. 3
Abbott C.J. puts it thus:
I believe that many persons who cause engines of this descrip-
tion to be placed on their grounds do not do so with the intention
of injuring any one, but really believe that the notices they
give of such engines being there, will prevent any injury from
occurring, and that no person who sees the notice will be weak
and foolish enough to expose himself to the perilous conse-
quence likely to ensue from his trespass.
14
Unless he is supposing a high degree of ignorance or self-deception about
the frequent"5 "accidents" involving spring guns (such as the accident to
the nutgatherer in Ilott v. Wilkes), Abbott C.J. is clearly confusing hope
with intention. Bayley J's confusions are between ends and means ("mo-
tive" and "intention," in a common legal jargon; "further" and "proximate"
intention), and between intention and emotions such as enthusiasm or
vindictiveness, or ex ante reluctance and ex post regret:
Such instruments may be undoubtedly placed without any in-
tention of doing injury, and for the mere purpose of protecting
property by means of terror; and it is extremely probable that
the defendant in this case will feel as much regret as any man
for the injury which the plaintiff has sustained .... 16
These confusions about that central legal and jurisprudential concept,
intention, were mercilessly exposed in two great articles in the Edinburgh
Review in 1821 by the famous publicist Sydney Smith. About Abbott's
argument, for example, Smith said:
But if this be the real belief of the engineer - if he think that
mere notice will keep people away - then he must think it a
mere inutility that guns should be placed at all: if he think
that many will be deterred, and few come, then he must mean
to shoot those few. 17
'a See J. FINNIS, J. BOYLE & G. GRISEZ, NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, MORALITY AND
REALISM 124 (1987) regarding an argument of Gerard Hughes SJ.
" Ilott v. Wilkes, at 309, 106 Eng. Rep. at 676.
"s See HANSARD, PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES 23 March 1827, H.C., cols. 19, 26
(the Home Secretary, Robert Peel, here speaks of the "daily accidents and mis-
fortunes arising from the use of them").
1 Ilott v. Wilkes, 3 B. & Ald. 304, 310, 106 Eng. Rep. 674, 677 (K. B. 1820).
17 S, SMITH, WORKS 316 (1854); see Evatt, The Judges and the Teachers of Public
Law, 53 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1151-52 (1940).
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And then Smith pressed home the argument which had failed in the hands
of counsel in Ilott but was to prevail in Parliament in 1827 and in the
eventual American position summarized by Holmes in 1921 and by the
Supreme Court of Ohio in 1938.18
Why were the King's Bench judges of 1820 so anxious to find that setting
spring guns need involve no intention to hurt or kill? They wanted to get
into a position to dispose of the issue (precisely: liability to one injured
by a spring gun with notice of the hidden presence of spring guns) on the
twin bases of assumption of risk (volenti non fit injuria) and the general
utility of protecting property, encouraging residence by land-owners, sup-
pressing crime, and so forth. So, likewise, even Lord Ellenborough (the
rising young politician son of the late Lord Chief Justice Ellenborough),
making the very last and most brutally frank, or frankly brutal, of the
parliamentary speeches in defense of spring guns, felt the need to veil
the immediate intention by confusing it with motive (further intention):
The object of setting Spring-guns [is] not personal injury to any
one, but to deter from the commission of theft; and that object
[is] as completely obtained by hitting an innocent man as a
guilty one. [T]he bill [is] contrary to that principle of the Eng-
lish law, which [gives] a man protection for his property, in
proportion to the difficulty with which it would be protected
by the ordinary means .... 19
The veil is here truly diaphanous - see-through - for the argument
tacitly concedes that the deterrent object will be attained only by an at
least occasional injury or death to a trespasser, innocent or culpable; such
injury or death is thus intended as a means to achieving the deterrent
object. In the fundamental structure of the common law, as of sound
jurisprudence, one private person's killing or injuring another with intent
to kill or injure is simply a commutative injustice, whatever the killer's
further purposes, objects, or motives. It is the sort of conduct, of trans-
action between persons, which is simply excluded from justification
whether by assumption of risk, fear of future greater harm, or any con-
siderations of distributive or allocative justice as between landowners,
game consumers, poachers and nut-gatherers like the unlucky Ilott.
But what about self-defense? Well, when defending oneself or another
against immediate personal violence, one's real intent need not be to do
"I State v. Childers, 133 Ohio St. 508, 514-15, 14 N.E.2d 767, 770 (1938). "[B]y
the overwhelming weight of authority, a person is not justified in taking human
life or inflicting bodily harm upon the person of another by means of traps ...
unless, as a matter of law, he would have been justified had he been personally
present and had taken the life or inflicted the bodily harm with his own hands."
19 HANSARD, PARLIMENTARY DEBATES 9 April 1827, H.L., col. 296 (substituting
direct for indirect speech).
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harm to the assailant for the sake of some further object such as deter-
rence, or disablement from some future revenge attack, or satisfying one's
desire to get one's own back. One's intent can and should be simply to
stop this attack by whatever means of stopping it are at hand. Thus, all
the harm to the assailant can be a side-effect, unintended. But are not
the side-effects of one's actions within one's responsibility? Certainly. And
are they not subject to moral assessment and possible condemnation?
Certainly; the very point of this paper is to reflect on some possible jur-
isprudential implications of our moral responsibility for our actions' side-
effects. So, if it can be fair and in all other ways reasonable to take
measures to stop an assailant, knowing that those measures may or will
be death-dealing, might it not also be fair and reasonable to take death-
dealing measures against mere trespassers and poachers, intending not
their death or injury as such, but simply to stop them in their current
unlawful entry? No. To do so, or think so, would be to confuse the intrinsic
personal good of human life with the merely instrumental good of prop-
erty. And it would be to depart from the Golden (and rational) Rule of
impartiality; for though a gentleman who found himself being homicid-
ally attacked by one of his own family or house guests might defend
himself with even a shotgun if nothing else lay to hand, no gentleman,
nobody, would use a shotgun and blow away one of his own family or
house guests whom he spotted making off with one of his pheasants. That
one should do nothing to others, and impose on them no harmful side-
effects, which one would not be willing to do to or impose upon oneself
and one's nearest and dearest is the most significant of those norms of
reasonableness, and thus of morality, which govern the creation of risk
and suffering as the unintended effects of one's choices and actions.
But, as young Lord Ellenborough's frankness made plain, the purpose
of laying spring guns was, often enough, precisely to do harm, as a de-
terrent means of stopping poaching, not merely to impose the risk of harm
as a side-effect of stopping poaching. Take the facts in Bird v. Holbrook,
20
in which, a year after Parliament had outlawed outdoor spring guns, the
Court of Common Pleas - its chief justice doubtless ruefully mindful of
the public denunciation which, as junior justice in the Court of Kings
Bench in Ilott v. Wilkes, he himself had received in 1821 at the hands of
Sydney Smith-ingloriously announced that what Parliament had just
enacted had all along been the common law in relation to spring guns
laid without notice. In this case, concerned with events before the Act of
1827, the defendant tulip gardener's reason for not posting notices was
that he wanted to catch the tulip thieves, by injuring them. (Instead, of
course, he mutilated only young Bird, who was trying, in broad daylight,
to help a neighbor by recapturing a peahen which had strayed into Hol-
brook's booby trapped garden.)
20 4 Bing. 628, 130 E.R. 911 (C.P. 1828).
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IV
Richard Posner made Bird v. Holbrook the centerpiece of his earliest
published exposition of the implications of economic analysis for the com-
mon law.2" Indeed, this is the one case which Posner cites in his textbook
treatment of the category of intentional torts. 22 Disclaiming (at that point)
any normative purpose, and offering only to "explain" the law's "pattern",
Posner says that the issue in the case "involved two legitimate activities,
raising tulips and keeping peahens".23 Spring guns may be the most cost-
effective means of protecting tulips in an era of negligible police protec-
tion; but they discourage the owners of domestic animals from pursuing
them onto other people's property and so increase the costs (enclosure
costs or straying costs) of keeping animals. 24 The challenge was "to design
a rule of liability that maximized the (joint) value of both activities, net
of any protective or other costs (including personal injuries). '25
With a stroke, the whole question of intention to injure is swept from
view; not only are the "personal injuries" homogenized into the other
costs of keeping peacocks, but the fact that these injuries were done by
one who intended to injure a human being (albeit not anticipated to be
a mere peacock-pursuer) is treated as wholly irrelevant. The argument
which had prevailed in Parliament is treated as of no consequence. And
explicitly so: "intentionality is neither here nor there," says Posner.26
Why not? The answer is a paradigm of the non sequitur:
It is surely not correct to say that society never permits the
sacrifice of human lives on behalf of substantial economic val-
ues. Automobile driving is an example of the many deadly
activities that cannot be justified as saving more lives than
they take. Nor can the motoring example be distinguished from
the spring-gun case on the ground that the one who sets a
spring-gun intends to kill or wound. In both cases, a risk of
death is created that could be avoided by substituting other
methods of achieving one's ends (walking instead of driving);
in both cases the actor normally hopes the risk will not ma-
terialize. 27
In short, for Posner, intending death and carelessly risking causing death
are equivalent because both involve creating the risk of death; A is equiv-
alent to B if A includes what is important about B. There is no need to
dwell on this fallacy. It is more profitable to notice some of the other
equivocations in this passage.
21 Posner, Killing or Wounding to Protect a Property Interest, 14 J. LAW & ECON.
201, 209 (1971) [hereinafter Posner].
22 R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 119-22 (2d ed. 1977) [hereinafter
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS].
23 Posner, supra note 21, at 209.
24 Posner, supra note 21, at 209-211.
25 Posner, supra note 21, at 210.26 Id. at 206.
27Id.
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First, the equivocation on "sacrifice." Posner's use of the phrase "sac-
rifice of human lives" treats as equivalent the decision to build a sky-
scraper, expecting that about three construction workers will fall off and
be killed, and the decision to kill three construction workers to encourage
the others to meet their performance targets.
Second, the equivocation on "hopes." Posner's claim that both in care-
lessly and in intentionally killing, "the actor normally hopes the risk will
not materialize" involves a double confusion. (i) The careless driver hopes
there will be no collision and that if there is, no-one will be killed; the
man-trapper hopes that no-one will invade his property but that anyone
who does will be shot. (ii) Many murders, perhaps most, are done with
great emotional reluctance and repugnance (if only for fear of detection
and punishment). Like Bayley J. in Ilott v. Wilkes, Posner has confused
emotion with will and willingness - i.e. with intention.
Posner's writings on intention are, indeed, a feast of fallacies. To prove
that the distinction between intentional and unintentional torts is "con-
fusing and unnecessary", his textbook, for example, begins:
Most accidental injuries are intentional in the sense that the
injurer knew that he could have reduced the probability of the
accident by taking additional precautions. The element of in-
tention is unmistakable when the tortfeasor is an enterprise
that can predict from past experience that it will inflict a cer-
tain number of accidental injuries every year.2
This argument is even less acceptable than the earlier proof that "inten-
tionality is neither here nor there". For now we have, not the claim that
intention is irrelevant to economic and legal analysis, but a claim that
intention is actually the same as foresight, and that the intentional is
just a version of the accidental. This is tantamount to saying that those
who fly the Atlantic, foreseeing jet-lag, intend to get jet-lag, that those
who walk intend to wear out their shoes - what one may call the "pseudo-
masochistic" theory of intention.
It is tempting to dwell on the corrupting potential of this conception of
intention. Since, for example, one can foresee that lecturing and writing
on difficult topics is certain to confuse some of one's audience, one may
as well (I don't suggest that Posner himself does) throw in a few deliberate
falsehoods when convenient for attaining one's goals - providing one
sets out with the hope that one will not "have to" resort to those measures,
and resorts to them with feelings of reluctance and regret.
But for present purposes it is enough to insist, against Posner, that
those who intend a result, whether for its own sake or as a means to
something else, are not merely creating a risk of that result. Rather, in
their own self-understanding, they are trying (however reluctantly) to
bring it about; they are not trying to create a risk of a result but trying
to create that result. They are not content to leave things to chance, i.e.
21 ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 22, at 119.
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to hazard or to risk, but are intervening to achieve what they intend. The
only risk they will acknowledge is - not the risk of that result happening
- but: the risk of that result not happening. That risk is just an inevitable
side-effect of their intention, choice and action, since none of us have the
divine capacity of making things be the case simply by willing them to
be the case.
V
Someone will object: Posner and the whole school of Economic Analysis
of Law who follow him in this29 are not concerned with the point of view,
the self-understanding, of agents, but with states of affairs in the world,
particularly states of affairs to which monetizable value can be attributed.
And, whatever one's school, one may say that it is far from clear why a
paper on allocating risks should be dwelling for so long on intention -
particularly a paper which insists that the intending in torts and crimes
of intention is a case neither of allocating (distributing a common stock)
nor, properly speaking, of creating a risk of harm. Let me address both
these objections together.
People say they are interested in states of affairs, not in the content of
the state of mind of the one who, whether deliberately or accidentally,
brings those states of affairs about. Very well. But they overlook the fact
that choices last. To intend something is to choose it, either for its own
sake or as a means; and to choose is to adopt a proposal (a proposal
generated by and in one's own deliberation). Once adopted, the proposal,
together with the reasoning which in one's deliberation made that pro-
posal intelligently attractive, remains, persists, in one's will, one's dis-
position to act. The proposal is, so to speak, synthesized into one's will,
one's practical orientation and stance in the world. This is a real, em-
pirical (though "spiritual") effect - side-effect - of one's adopting a
proposal.
Now, whatever consequences lie outside one's proposal, whatever re-
sults of one's choice are not included in the proposal because neither
wanted for their own sake nor needed as a means, are not synthesized
into one's will. Though one may foresee these results, and accept that one
will be causing them, or the risk of them, one is not adopting them. They
are side-effects, incidental risks. One may be culpable in accepting them.
But the ground of culpability will not be that one intended them, but
that one wrongly, e.g. unfairly, accepted them as incidents of what one
did intend. And just as one is never trying to achieve them - not even
reluctantly trying - so one's character is not changed or shaped by one's
acceptance of them, in the manner it is shaped by forming and pursuing
an intention.
See, e.g., Calabresi and Melamed's discussion of spring-guns. Calabresi &Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, at 1126 n. 71 (1972).
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Next we must notice that when one intends some harm to (an)other
human person or persons - when one's proposal includes, however re-
luctantly, some destruction of or damage to some basic aspect of their
personhood, e.g. their bodily integrity, or their participation in knowledge
of reality - whether one intends that harm for its own sake, as in revenge,
or as a means, as in killing or maiming pour encourager les autres or in
deception for the sake of fraud or in perjury for the sake of justice, one
is shaping oneself as one who, in the most radical way, exploits others.
The reality and the fulfillment of those others is radically subjected to
one's own reality and fulfillment, or to the reality and fulfillment of some
other group of persons. In intending harm, one precisely makes their loss
one's gain, or the gain of some others; one to that extent uses them up,
treats them as material, as a resource for a good that no longer includes
their own.
In Economic Analysis of Law, this exploitativeness is especially drastic
and especially unreasonable. For, as Lewis Kornhauser points out, the
Economic Analysis of Law "applies neoclassical microeconomic theory to
the analysis of ... legal systems" (rather than applying the classical
theory of e.g. Adam Smith), and "neoclassical microeconomics assumes
that individuals always act in their own, fixed, immutable self-interest"
and precisely by doing so are "completely rational".30 Kornhauser will
not, I think, object if I say that this use of the term "rationality" -
however widespread it may be in economics, game theory, public choice
theory, and the like - is profoundly misleading. 31 And the theories of
human behavior which employ it, if taken as sufficient guides to real
choices and actions, are exemplary instances of the folly denounced (as
we saw) by Adam Smith, the folly of thinking that an ingenious gadget
which might sometime be useful for something is therefore a good thing
to have, to work for, to be concerned with.
For, in reality, the very first insight of human practical understanding
is that human goods and harms, as intelligible objects of intelligent want-
ing or avoidance, have no proper names attached to them. Intelligent
human motivation is not egoistic. It responds to the value of human
flourishing, in its diverse aspects and diverse personal subjects, whoever
they may be. One can choose to be an egoist. But then one is following,
not reason, but feelings of self-preference. (The way one then pursues
one's self-interest may be cunning or in some other way intelligent, but
this will not make one's egoistic self-preference an intelligent motivation.)
And one is also overlooking or mislocating and mutilating the intelligible
human good of community, of harmony between persons in a mutual
sharing in fulfillment - a harmony which is a basic human good, intel-
ligibly valuable for its own sake.
3 Kornhauser, Economic Analysis of Law, 16 MATERIALI PER UNA STORIA DELLA
CULTURA JURIDICA 233, 234 (1986).
31 See Finnis, The Authority of Law in the Predicament of Contemporary Social
Theory, 1 NOTRE DAME J. OF L., ETHics AND PUB. POL. 115, 121-33 (1984).
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In short, what neoclassical economics calls "rational" is rational only
within the project (and resulting technique) of being a successful egoist.
But the project of being an egoist is a paradigmatic form of irrationality,
or practical unreasonableness. 2
In its execution, of course, Economic Analysis of Law always looks to
some community wider than the ego. (It would have no audience if it did
not.) But its identification of the community whose self-interest is to be
advanced, whose wealth is to be maximized, is always as little the work
of a maximizing reason as is Posner's arbitrary declaration that the issue
in Bird v. Holbrook was not whether one subject of the law can inten-
tionally kill or maim another subject of the law, but whether laying spring
guns increases the costs of peacock rearing more than it diminishes the
costs of tulip growing. If one really cares for one's own interests, or if
one's community and its government and law attend only to the interests
of its current members, one will, of course, attend not at all to the interests
of future generations. (And thus the very intelligibility of "a community"
will be lost, somewhat as the intelligibility of motion is lost (as Zeno
observed) if one tries to reduce it to a sequence of points; for people are
being born into and dying out of the community at every moment: Which
momentary community, then, is to count in assessing efficiency, whether
productive or allocative?)
The inability of Economic Analysis of Law to handle, with its own
conceptual resources, the problem of future generations - generations
which, or rather who, start right now - is obvious enough23 Similarly,
economistically-minded governments, such as the United Kingdom's, rec-
ommend a discount rate to be used in cost-benefit analyses of social proj-
ects; the rate reflects the time preferences of British adults today, for jam
today as opposed to a little more jam tomorrow.34 But the whole approach
overlooks the fact that "the people today are not the same as the people
tomorrow. Discounting wealth accrued tomorrow therefore disadvantages
later generations."35 And the U.K. government's discount rate renders
negligible the costs of latent deaths from current risk-producing activities
if those deaths are delayed for as little as 30 years. 36 Our judgment that
this is unreasonable cannot be supported, or undermined, by any economic
principle.
What might support such a judgment? I return to the apparently dif-
ferent topic of intention and intentional harm. The principle that one
must never choose (intend) harm to the person of any human individual
both expresses and preserves the judgment that each human individual
32 See Grisez, Boyle, and Finnis, Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ulti-
mate Ends, 32 AM. J. JURISP. (1987) 99, 101, 114-15 (1987).
' It is patiently and helpfully explored in Kornhauser, A Guide to the Perplexed
Claims of Efficiency in Law 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 591, 614-16 (1980).
- Health and Safety Executive, THE TOLERABILITY OF RISK FROM NUCLEAR
POWER STATIONS 34 (H.M.S.O., London, 1988).
15 Kornhauser, supra note 33, at 615.
11 Health and Safety Executive, supra note 34.
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is more than just a locus of utility or wealth (to be measured at some
arbitrarily chosen future moment), or a channel or conduit for maximizing
that wealth or utility (again, a maximum as measured at some chosen
future moment). It expresses and preserves each individual person's den-
sity, so to speak, or dignity, if you will, as an equal of everyone else in
basic rights. To choose harm is the paradigmatic wrong, the exemplary
instance of denial of right.
When the techniques of neoclassical economics are allied to the doc-
trines of legal positivism, one gets Economic Analysis of Law as it is
practiced by Posner, Calabresi, and others. The function of law is then
conceived as: to allocate entitlements with a view to future maximizing
of wealth. The fact that one person has in the past - just a moment ago
- been intentionally harmed and thus wronged by another is "neither
here nor there", except insofar as a law may have been made to bestow
on the injured party, or on someone else, a remedy in the interests of
maximizing social wealth by deterring and thus minimizing waste in
transactions and dealings between persons.
In another jurisprudential perspective, however, a primordial and al-
ways primary (though not the only primary) function of government and
law is to rectify this commutative injustice by ensuring that the injurer
does the injured the commutative justice of reparation. (There was reason
for the Roman jurists to treat Delict under the heading of Obligations.)
No doubt there is a distributive, allocative aspect to this activity of gov-
ernment and legal system. From a common stock of possible activities to
be undertaken, costs incurred and individual responsibilities to be drawn
upon and distributed, the government and the law assign some part to
this task of underwriting and guaranteeing commutative justice. Doing
so is an act of distributive justice, but is ancillary to the prior, identifiable
relationship of commutative injustice and potential commutative, repar-
ative justice between the individuals. In this perspective, again, the dign-
ity of the individuals, each ends in themselves (and in each basic aspect
of their reality and potentiality as persons), is again expressed and pre-
served. A judge who tried to decide Bird v. Holbrook by the method com-
mended by Posner - comparing costs of tulip growing with costs of
peacock rearing - would be gravely violating his duty.
And government and law, in that act of reparative justice, can be seen
to have a role quite distinct from achieving any future "end-state" state
of affairs. The political community, unlike a one-project firm which must
account to its shareholders at the end of the project, has no goal. Its
success in fulfilling its responsibilities cannot be measured by any tech-
nique comparable to accounting. Success and failure are measured by
quite other norms. Is everyone protected from intentional harm and every
(other) form of exploitation by anyone else? Is the whole stock of natural
resources made available to all - not by a naive communistic distribution
and continual redistribution to ensure steady equal shares for all current
members of the community, but by a system of appropriation and hus-
bandry which will preserve the interests of future members of the com-
munity by encouraging fair distribution between "life tenant", heirs,
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employees and other present dependents, and future remaindermen and
reversioners, in a sustainable economy in a sustainable world?
VI
This is not the place to continue sketching the requirements of justice
in political community. But I should say a little more about how intention
and intentional wrong is related to the vast problem of harmful side-
effects (including latent and long-term side-effects in environmental deg-
radation of every kind).
Moral responsibility and consequent legal liability for intentional infl-
iction of harm are paradigmatic, exemplary. Avoiding such wrongs is only
a necessary, not a sufficient condition of acting justly. But the same respect
for each individual whom one might have harmed as a means to an end
carries over into, and informs, the quite different principle of fairness.
Here one encounters the quite different type of commutative injustice
involved in imposing harmful side-effects without complying with ra-
tional principles such as the Golden Rule, and without attending to truths
such as that no-one has an a priori superior claim on the earth's resources
and no-one, therefore, has unqualified dominion over any part of them.
The Golden Rule in its application involves a discernment of feelings
and then a dispassionate rational adherence to the standard of care es-
tablished by one's feelings. To what I have said in my other paper,3 7 let
me add that, without denying the peculiar and strategic importance of
intention, legal thought can and does reasonably find criteria of fairness
and unfairness in analogies to the intentional.
So the prohibition on spring-guns (or at least on unnotified spring-
guns) laid with intent to wound extends to identify as unjust the omissions
of those who inherit already-laid spring-guns and retain them without
such intent to wound; or who allow similarly lethal and concealed con-
ditions to persist on their land when they know that what disguises the
lethality also exercises a fatal attraction or allurement to innocent strang-
ers, including trespassers. But the range of the analogy must be controlled
not by verbal or "conceptual" considerations - puns on "trap", "entrap-
ment", etc. - but by considerations of fairness: how one wishes others to
behave to oneself and one's friends; how one would behave when one's
friends or children strayed from the straight and narrow. If one would
not, even for a substantial reward, bury bombs accessibly under the sur-
face of one's land with warning notices likely to disappear (without re-
placement) in one's children's lifetime, then one should not, I suggest,
regard it as right to accumulate and bury lethal wastes whose lethality
will far outlast any likely duration of one's warning notices.
This conception of the fairness which informs commutative justice is
not, to use Adam Smith's title, a theory of moral sentiments. But it is a
theory of the proper role of sentiments in giving content and application
to a moral principle which itself is simply rational. The normal form in
37 See Finnis, Natural Law and Legal Reasoning, 38 CLEv. ST. L. REV. 1 (1990).
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which these sentiments make their presence felt in jurisprudence and
legal reasoning, of course, is in the form of conventions, 38 customs, the
far from bloodless life of the reasonable person - a life fit for use as a
jurisprudential and judicial reference-point only if purified, however, of
those self-deceptions, dishonesties, evasions, and pragmatic machiavel-
lianisms which give us the idiomatic pejorative sense of "practical": "let's
be practical about this" - a thinly veiled invitation to unfairness or some
other form of injustice.3 9
38 See Kelley, Who Decides? Community Safety Conventions at the Heart of Tort
Liability, 38 CLEV. ST. L. REV. - (1990) [Due to space limitations, this article
will be appearing in the next issue of the CLEVELAND STATE LAW REvIEw - Editor's
note.].
-9 See Tushnet, A Critical Legal Studies Perspective 38 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 137,
sec. II (1990).
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